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HARDEN

J.;'. No. 19244.

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

C.2d

In Bank.

\VILLlAM R HARDEN et al.,
PERIOR COUR'l' OF' ALAMEDA
spondent CITY OF HAYWARD, Real

SURein Interest.

[1] Prohibition-Grounds-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-Conof statute or ordinance may be tested
prohibition on ground that invalidity of
goes to
jurisdiction of court to proceed to try case.
[2] !d.-Grounds-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-In
tion, court is limited to proceedings without or in excess of
jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1102.)
[3] !d.-Presentation of Objection.-When trial court has determined that it has jurisdiction, prohibition will lie to
exercise thereof when jurisdiction is
in that court
by demurrer, motion, plea or other
of some kind.
[4] Id.-Grounds-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-Where trial
court has decided in favor of its own
and is
purporting to exercise it, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction
has been exercised and higher courts will restrain lower court
from acting in excess of its jurisdiction.
[5] !d.-Other Remedies-AppeaL-Fact that appeal is available
does not, in and of itself, necessarily preclude resort to prohibition.
[6] Id.- Other Remedies- Appeal.- Code Civ. Proc., § 1103,
authorizes issuance of writ of prohibition, though appeal may
be taken, if remedy by appeal is inadequate.
[7] !d.-Other Remedies-Appea.l.--In usual situation
rs
considered adequate remedy, but no hard and fast rule can
be laid down in advance whether it fully meets requirements
of justice in particular case.
from
[8] Id.-Other Remedies-AppeaL-A remedy
judgment at end of trial is not adequate so as to preclude
[1] Determination of constitutionality of statute in prohibition
proceeding, note, 113 A.L.R. 796. See also Cal.Jur., Prohibition,
§ 4; Am.,Tur., Prohibition, § 32.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition,§ 6; Am.Jur., Prohibition,§ 8 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Prohibition, § 16(1);
Prohibition, §51; [5] Prohibition, §
; [6-9] Prohibition, 14(2);
[10] Appeal and Error, § 39; [11, 17] Eminent
§ 185;
[12] Prohibition, §§ 11, 16 (1) ; [13]
§ 83,
Pleading,
§ 87; [15] JiJminent Domain, § 150;
26; [18]
Municipal Corporations, § 98; [19 J
§ 8; [20 J
Eminent Domain, § 25.

HARDE::1"

v.

SuPERIOR

CouR'r

681

when court has no jurisdiction
is available before final
!d.-Other Remedies-Appeal.-vVhere an order is not appealable hut is reviewable
on appeal from subsequent judgsueh as expense of proceeding with
from
may operate to
and prohibition a proper remedy.
Appeal- Decisions Appealable.- An order overruling demurrer not
[lla,
Eminent Domain - Prohibition.-Where petitioners
would be forced to g'o through expense of trial of eminent
domain notion by city before appenl from judgment rendered
therein would be available to them and before it would be
for
court to test city's right to exercise
power of eminent domain outside its corporate limits, and
allege that in interim partially constructed
will suffer destruction from elements, thieves or vanand that
have been ordered by county to provide
for walls of such partially constructed buildat inerensed expense, they do not have speedy and adequate
by appeal and prohibition is proper remedy.
[12] Prohibition-When Writ Lies.-Prohibition will lie in case
where it
that otherwise failure of justice will occur
in matter
public importance by wrongful or excessive
exercise of jurisdiction.
[13] Pleading-Demurrer-Necessity That Objection Appear on
Face of Pleading.-A demurrer reaches only matters appearing
on face of pleading to which it is directed.
[14] Id.- Demurrer- Grounds- Want of Jurisdiction.-A demarrer to jurisdiction of court of general jurisdiction lies
only where want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively on face
of
[15] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Pleadings.-Lack of jurisdiction appears from city's allegation that its action in eminent
domain involves land outside its corporate limits without
uH'fO''"'" its authority to condemn.
Prohibition-Pleading.-Ordinarily sufficiency of complaint
will not be inquired into on application for writ of prohibition,
and where demurrer is erroneously overruled, litigant's only
relief is appeal from final judgment; but when it is shown that
court, in overruling demurrer, is proceeding without jurisdiction over subject matter of action, prohibition may issue.
Eminent Domain-Prohibition.-If there is neither express
statutory authority nor case law authorizing city to proceed
See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 61; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 208.
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jurisdiction to
[18] Municipal Corporations-General Powers- Extraterritorial
Powers.-Power of
to
in or incident to powers
necessarily or
granted, or essential to declared
and purposes of corporation.
[19] Eminent Domain-Who May Exercise
-A municipal corporation has no inherent power of eminent
domain and can exercise it, if at all, only when expressly
authorized by law.
[20] Id.- Uses For Which Right May Be Exercised- Parking
Facilities.-Word "purchase" as used in Gov. Code, § 37351,
declaring that legislative body "may purchase, lease, or receive
such personal property and real estate situated inside or outside the city limits as is necessary or proper for municipal
purposes," may not be construed as expressly to authorize
city to take private property for off-street parking outside its
boundaries by eminent domain proce€dings.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Alameda County from further proceedings in an
eminent domain action. vVrit granted.
Popper & Burnstein and Hobert C. Burnstein for Petitioners.

J. F'. Coakley, District Attorney, R. Robert Hunter, Chief
Assistant District Attorney, and Richard H. Klippert, Deputy
District Attorney, for Respondent.
John \V. Scanlon, City Attorney, Breed, Robinson & Stewart
and Bestor Robinson, Special Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
CARTER, J.-Petitioners, William R Harden and Pearl B.
Harden, his wife, Chester N. Harden and Virginia Hart
Harden, his wife, seek a writ of prohibition to restrain further
proceedings in an eminent domain action brought against them
and other property mvners
the city of Hayward.
Petitioners own certain land in AlameC!a County, lying
adjacent to, but outside the corporate boundaries of, the
city of Hayward. On ,J nne 28, 1954, petitioners obtained
a building permit from the county of Alameda which author-
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construction.
of an act ion in eminent
building-.
111

f1eJm:rrer1. Tbc dc1954. and petitioners
complaint.
a
fo}1owcd.
1H1dition i o the above-mentioned facts. ne1it ioners allegt~
that nll 'York has be'm
tho bnilding; that the
construetod
of bring lost or
theft or vandalism and
win suffer a loss in
of Alameda has ordered
masonry '.Yalls of the partially
because of the abandonment of the
eon:otrnetiou
the ,1etermillation of the eondenmation
c:nit. Pctiti(mers also
that tbe Joss
will suffer from
the clestruetion of the
strneture is not comprnsable
an eminent domnin ae:ion mv1 that if forced
the masm1ry walls,
will suffer adclicontemled that the
's complaint
that the adion in cminrnt domain is not
of t hr sixth class may not exercise
as to
outside its corwith th"
an appeal from
and that a
it::snc. The cit.'' filed
mmnorn ndnm
that the petition
,;hould be 1k11 ied bl'canse
remedy exists by way
from t lw .i
and tlwt the
is not

G3-i

defective

011

the
limits.
[1] We
2d
4G2
statute

limited
jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc.,
squarely confronted with the
referred to abovr. ''
[3] \Ve went on to hold that when the trial court has heard
and determined that it has jurisdiction,
vYill lie
to prevent the exercise thereof when that
challenged in that court "by demurrer, motion,
objection of some kind." [ 4] \Yhen the trial court has
heard and determined the jurisdictional
and has
decided in favor of its own jurisdiction, and then proceeds to
act-to try the cause on its merits, it may then be claimed
ihat a court ·without jurisdiction is purporting to exercise it.
Then, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction has been exercised and the higher courts will restrain the lower conrt from
acting in excess of its
(
v.
Court, 19 Cal.2d 319
; A.belleira v. District
Court of Appeal, 17 CaL2d 280 [109 P.2d
132 A.IJ.l\.
715]; Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350
P.2d
243, 113 A.L.R. 1422] .)
The city contends that prohibition will not lie in that
petitioners have a speedy and
by 1vay of
appeal. [5] As was held in Gorbache[f v. Justice's
31 CaL2d 178, 180 [187 P.2d 407], the fact that an
is available does
in and of itself,
resort to prohibition. [6] Section 1103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure authorizes
an appeal may be taken, if the
quate. [7] In the usual situation an
considered
an adequate remedy, "but no hard and fast rule can be laid
down to determine in adyance whether it fully meets the
requirements of justice in a particular ease."
[8] We said in Providence Baptist Church v. Superior
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389,
,..,Hi'DIJT'HJr

Court,

[9] 'Where
upon appeal
such as exlPellse
from
(Phelan v.
P.2d 951].)"
the de233 [168 P.2d
Tel. Co. v. Damenstein, 81 Cal.App.2d.
,
would be forced to
the expense of
trial of the eminent domain
an appeal from the
rendered therein
to them and before it would be possible for
court to test
city's right to exercise the
limits. In
outside its
that the partially constructed
from the
have been ordered by the
for the walls of said
It is
~···v"~~ that in the event
city should
in the
action, this additional expense would not
as damages. The city argues that since
values are fixed as of the date of issuance of summons (Code
§ 1249) it is
whether the
concrete block walls
or collapse. This contention
that the expense to
does not answer
which
will have been subjected
complying with the
order to
the walls is not compensable, and
that it
not be.
also
that
them is a parcel of a larger area
resolution and that others besides
themselves will be
by the city's allegedly unauthorized
exercise of its power of eminent domain. [12] We held in
&;
San Frwncisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.
P.2d 581], that prohibition would lie in
.,,.,.,.,,,.,.nr~ that otherwise a failure of justice

and
ascertained
is
of eminent domain in its
as a
Sixth
the same is
defined under the Constitution and Laws of the State of
California, or ·whether it is
to exercise eminent domain as a '
' under the Vehicle Parking
District Law of 1943, the
I.JaW of 1949 or the Parking
District La1v of 1951.'' 'l'he
that plaintiff
sixth class; that its legiswhich it
to
defendthat the

or other objection of some
.A demurrer reaches
matters appearing
on the face of the
to which it is directed (21 Cal.Jur.,
p. 94) ; [14] and a demurrer to the jurisdiction of a court of
general
lies
1vhere the want of jurisdiction
appears affirmatiYely on the face of the
(Doll v.
Peller, 16 Cal. 432; 41
§ 213, pp. 443, 444).
[15] It may be said here that the lack of jurisdiction appears
from the city's
that the action involved land outits authority to so
side its corporate limits 'Without
eondemn.
Petitioners did demur on the
that tbe eomplaim

[13]

appeal.''
from suit
Prohibition may
by
As sum-

a
be
to:rction 1102

V"
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;wtion in
:-:ion bcfor·e

[17] If it

Cm1rt,

'fhe fact that the per\Yay forecloses the court
eow;ti1utional aPd
power to
" In Northwestern Pac" R Co" Vo
454
Po2d
lOll
failure of the
to comply
to maintain an eminrnt domain
the Public Utilities Commisutility service"
>vas, as contended by petinor (~ase law,
e1uincnt domain against
e limii
it \rou1d sPcm
the trial court would
in ibe rm1nent domain
In Redlands High 8ch. Disf.

eminent do rna in action
boundaries and relies upon
91 Cal. 238 [27 P.
. Tl1e
1111der section 1237 et seq.
to condemn a

"main
" relied upon
corporation of the :fifth or sixth class
as a condition precedent to invoking the exercise of the pcnver or mninent
make an
effort to agree vdth the 0\Yner of the
property or right 'which it seeks to
that it
in :my condemnation
allege and
prove that it has made that effort. The court held that this
condition
the uniform
of a
law
''and is special in a case where a general la1v not
can
lw rnade applicable, but in vYlJich a
law had been
and in which there is no conceivable reason for
rriserimination.'' 'fhe court cited section 1001 of the Civil
that an.1· person may acquire private
Code which
property for any use
in section 1238 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and section 14 of the Civil Code which
provides that a private or public
is a "person,"
and section 1238 of the Code of Civil Proeednrr ·which ineludes
''sewerage'' as one of the purposes for whiel1
may be taken. \-Vhile the po·wer of Pasadena to exercise eminent domain outside its
Emits ·was not diseussed in
the opinion, the case
stands for the proposition
that it does have the power.
in "~l1llvme v. City
San
J 83 CaL
, thP
of the power of a
emhwllt doma n outside
its boundaries was
involved. It was there said: ''In
general, a nmnieipality is
its boundaries only in those easrs

sec.
Corporations, states
rule is that without legisof the
corporation is
its acts
ordinances have
Thus, in the absence of
caunot open a street, repair a
aid in the construction of
its boundaries. Sometimes
--------..,--- boundaries may be
HJ.ljJJ.J.t;u on
ground of necessity, as for
to obtain
outlets for sewers and drains. . . . Likewise a municipality
power to supply its inhabitants with water, may
onrmn•n. for that purpose, a water supply without its terri... ' (4
on Municipal Corporations, § 1824.) ''
The court continued : ''Therefore, in the case of a municiof the boundaries of the muis
upon legislative grant ; it
not exist unless expressly granted,
or fairly
uutJ.uxou in or incident to the powers expressly
or
essential to the declared
and purposes of
corporation. (Hyatt v.
148 CaL 585, 587 [84 P. 41];
Pasadena v. Pasadena Land etc. Co., 152 Cal. 579,
P.
analogy the same rule applies in
aeitermrnutg whether or not bonds of a municipal improvement district may be
the proceeds of which are to be
used in the construction of public works outside of the boundaries of the district." It was concluded that the act involved
for and permitted only such public improvements

Procedure which
''
to the
of this
the
domain may be exercised in behalf of the
uses:
Off-street motor vehicle;
'' 1. Off-street
necessary or eoJJvenient for
places,
thereto or egress
established
any
and
for
The city's argument is that the above section of the Code
of Civil Procedure, taken
with sections 37351 and
37353 of the Government
it to acquire
property outside its
Section 37351
provides in part: ''The
may
lease,
m· Teeeive such
and real estate situated inside or mdsicle the
limits as is necessary or proper for
municipal purposes.
. " (Emphasis added.) Section 37353
provides in part: '' 'fhe
may
property
needed for:
motor vehicles." It is claimed that
these sections and section 1001 of
Civil Code show that the
subject of boundaries is extraneous to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain
for the situation set forth in
subdivision 2 of section 1241. Section 1241
that
when tvvo-thirds of the
body of certain municipal
corporations, including
pass a resolution or ordinance
finding that the public interest and
the taking, that finding is conclusive evidence on the question of
necessity as to
within the
'fhe section also
ordinance shall not be such
provides that "said resolution
conclusive evidence in the case of the
any county,
city and county, or
or school district, or irrigation, public
or water
of property
located outside of the territorial limits thereof.'' (Emphasis
added.) It is contended that by "clear implication," the sections authorize the exercise of the power outside the cor-

148

169
175 Cal.
Cal.
185 CaL 440, 444
substantial doubt
44 C.2d-21

In re

[5]

McK.
References:
inal Law, § 994;
§ 986; [7] Criminal
inal Law, § 1022;
§58; [12] Criminal Law, § 1022.

